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ABSTRACT
We examine the factors that determine the differences in cx ante returns on equities in
eleven Pacific Basin countries. Our concern is whether real return differentiais are primarily
caused by nominal return differentials or expected changes in real exchange rates. We find that
nominal return differentials account for most of the difference, which suggests that either there
is not free mobility of capital between the countries of our study or that there are significant
differences in the riskiness of returns across countries. We do not find a significant relationship
between the size of the return differentials and the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate.
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Equity markets have grown rapidly andrestrictionson investments have declined
equally rapidly in Pacific Basin countries in the 1980s. The return on equities now
provides a good measure of the opportunity cost of capital in the eleven countries that
are the focus of this study: Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States.
The purpose of equity markets is to allocate capital to its most efficient use. In
the absence of uncertainty, efficient equity markets ensure that the marginal product of
capital is equalized among its various uses. In the presence of uncertainty, equity
markets price assets to reflect not only the expected return on the asset, but the
riskiness of projects as well.
A great deal of attention has been focused in recent years on the international
mobility of capital. If there are restrictions on capital flows between countries, then
investors will not be able to allocate their resources toward their most desirable use.
There appears to have been a global trend toward liberalization of capital markets and
toward allowing foreigners access to local markets. However, there is no consensus as to
whether these moves have achieved true integration of international capital markets.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) questioned the degree of integration of international
capital markets. They argued that if capital could flow freely between countries that
savers would have no bias toward channeling their funds toward domestic projects. If
capital markets allocated savings efficiently, then the savings of residents of one
country should be just as likely to be used to fund investments in foreign countries as
1to fund capital projects at home. So, we should not expect to see a close relation
between the level of saving in a country and the level of investment. There is no
particular reason why high saving countries should also be countries with excellent
investment opportunities.
However, in examining a cross-section of OECD countries over the period 1960-1974,
Feldstein and Horioka found a strong correlation between national saving/GDP ratios and
investment/GDP ratios. The simple correlation coefficient is greater than .90. The
authors interpret their findings as evidence of barriers to the international flow of
funds: ".•. ifportfolio preferences and institutional rigidities impede the flow of long-
term capital among countries, increases in domestic saving will be reflected primarily in
additional domestic investment."
The findings of Feldstein and Horioka are surprising and have led many economists
to search for ways to reconcile these conclusions with the observation that there are few
restrictions on capital flows among OECD countries, and that transactions costs have
fallen to very low levels. While many explanations for Feldstein and Horioka's results
have emerged over the years, perhaps the most compelling has been offered by Frankel
(1986, 1991). Frankel makes a distinction between portfolio capital and physical
capital. Investment, as measured by Feldstein and Horioka, refers to the accumulation of
physical capital. However, when economists speak of international capital mobility, they
are not referring to the movement of physical capital. It is clear that moving actual
machines and factories would be very costly. Nobody would describe such movements as
"free". Mobility of capital, instead, refers to the movement of portfolio capital.
In essence, Feldstein and Horioka's theory is that international mobility of
capital would equalize risk-adjusted ex ante real rates of return. With real rates of
return the same across countries, there would be no reason for savers to channel their
funds exclusively to home projects. Indeed, if a desirable investment opportunity arises
2abroad, the marginal product of capital, and therefore the real return on investment, is
pushed up temporarily in that foreign country. Then, capital will flow to that country
until the real return there is drawn back into equality with ex ante real returns in
other countries.
Thus, letting iequalthe real rate of return between period t and period t+ 1 in
country j,andletting rk1 be the analogous return for country k, the Feldstein-Horioka
null hypothesis is that free international capital mobility implies
(1) Er Erk =0, tt+1tI+I
forall countries jandk. In this expression, E refers to the expectations that
investors form at time t (so that, for example, Er1 is the expectation at time t of
the real rate of return between time t and t+1 in country j.)
Frankel,however, notes that relationship (1) is really a condition that one would
expect to hold if physical capital were free to move internationally. Then, efficient
markets would insure that the real returns to owners of capital are the same,
irrespective of the location of the capital.
However, as noted above, few economists interpret the notion of capital mobility as
applying to actual machines and factories. If the ex ante return on capital is
temporarily high in some country, economists do not envision entrepreneurs unbolting
machines and disassembling factories to ship them over to the country with the high rate
of return. Instead, portfolio capital will flow to that country. Funds will be made
available so that entrepreneurs can build new factories in the country where the marginal
product of capital is high.
Frankel notes that free mobility of portfolio capital will result in the
equalization of the nominal rate of return on investments, adjusted for expectations of
currency depreciation. That is, when capital flows freely, investors should expect the
same return on funds that are kept at home and funds that are sent abroad:
3(2) Ei3, -Eik,
-Ed,0.
In this equation, i is the nominal rate of return. So, E, is the rate of return in
country j, denominated in the currency of country j, that investors expect between time
and t + 1, while Eik1 is the analogous rate of return for country k. To make these two
rates of return comparable, they must be converted into a common currency. We use the
symbol d, to refer to the rate of depreciation of currency j relative to currency k
between time t and t+l. So, Ed, is the expected rate of depreciation of currency j at
time t.Equation (2) says that free mobility of portfolio capital implies that the
expected nominal returns on investments in any two countries j and k, when expressed in a
common currency, will be equalized.
What is the difference between expression (1) which states that ex ante real
returns are the same, and equation (2) which indicates the equality of expected nominal
returns? We can write the expected real return in country j as
(3) Er' =Ei -Eu' It+I t t+1t t+1
Here,En1 is the rate of inflation of country j's prices that is expected to occur
between time t and t+ 1. Using relation (3), we can write the difference in the ex ante
real rates of return as
(4) Er' Erk =[Ei'Eik EcVk] + [Ed -En'+ElrkI 11+11 1+1 tt+l 11+1I 1+1 I 1+11 t+lI1+1
Thefirst bracketed term on the right hand side of equation (4) is the ex ante nominal
return differential, as in equation (2). The ex ante nominal return differential does
not equal the expected real return differential unless the second bracketed term on the
right side of equation (4) is zero. That term is the expected change in the real value
of currency j relative to currency k. Thus, the real return condition expressed in
equation (I) is equivalent to the nominal return condition in equation (2) if and only if
ex ante purchasing power parity (PPP) holds.
So, investment projects in one country may indeed have a higher expected real
4return than investment projects in another country, even if there is perfect
international mobility of portfolio capital. That can occur as long as the expected
change in the real exchange rate is not zero. Economists have long understood conditions
under which ex ante PPP would not hold, and these conditions are not necessarily related
to the presence or absence of capital controls. For example, Dornbusch (1976) examines
the behavior of exchange rates and interest rates in a model with perfect capital
mobility, but one in which PPP fails to hold because nominal goods prices are "sticky".
That is, in Dornbusch's framework, in the long-run equilibrium prices adjust toward PPP,
but this adjustment occurs only gradually over time. Thus, deviations from PPP persist
for long periods. In Dornbusch's extended Mundell-Fleming framework, national saving and
investment rates can be highly correlated even in the presence of free portfolio capital
mobility. Other authors (for example, Razin (1984)) have emphasized that PPP need not be
a condition of equilibrium in the market for goods when there are non-traded goods.
Engel and Kletzer (1989) show that in general one should expect to find a high
correlation between the level of saving and investment in countries when non-traded goods
are present.
While Feldstein and Horioka and most of the subsequent related literature has
focused on capital mobility in OECD countries, there has recently developed considerable
interest in the nature of capital flows among Pacific Rim countries. In part that
interest has arisen naturally from the increased capital flows that have occurred between
these countries which was spurred by the widespread liberalization of capital markets and
financial reforms that occurred in this region in the 1970s and 1980s. (See Cheng (1986)
for a collection of papers that extensively studies these issues.) Of particular
interest for our purposes has been the concomitant expansion of local equity markets in
the region. As these markets have developed, the opportunities for international
investors who are seeking high return or diversification have expanded. In this study,
5we will explore the success of these equity markets equalizing real returns on investment
opportunities.
In particular, we will focus on the issue raised by Frankel: Do real returns
between countries differ because ex ante nominal rates of return are different, or
because ex ante purchasing power parity fails to hold? We develop a measure of the
relative importance of these two components of real return differentials in explaining
the average difference in expected real returns on equities across pairs of countries on
the Pacific Rim.
Our findings show that generally it is the ex ante nominal return differentials
that account for most of the difference in real return prospects for equity investors
across countries. This result holds across most pairs of countries in the region,
although it is not universal.
We focus on whether the exchange rate arrangements of the various countries
influences the importance of nominal return differentials versus deviations from PPP in
explaining ex ante real return differentials. Our findings are that there does not
appear to be any consistent relation between the types of exchange rate arrangements and
the relative strength of the two components.
In reaching the conclusion that most of the difference in real returns is
attributable to the gap between expected nominal returns, we have not been able to adjust
for risk. Hence, while our findings may imply that there are still important
restrictions to the flow of financial capital among Pacific Rim countries that prevents
the equalization of ex ante nominal returns, it is also possible that the differences in
returns stem from the difference in the relative riskiness of the equity investments.
In section II of this paper, we present the methods we employ for measuring the
relative strength of deviations from ex ante nominal returns equality versus ex ante PPP.
Our methods are related to those of Frankel (1991, 1992), Chinn and Frankel (1992), Glick
6(1987) and Glick and Hutchison (1990) which focus on markets for lending rather than
equity markets.
Section III discusses the nature of restrictions on investments in equity markets
in the Pacific Rim and the types of foreign exchange rate systems that prevail in these
countries. We also discuss the data that we use in our empirical study.
Section IV presents the results of our study, and discusses the forces that lead to
different degrees of influence of financial market versus goods market integration in the
Pacific Basin. In section V we offer some conclusions and discuss the implications of
our findings.
H. Decomposing the Real Return Differential
In this section, we present a method for decomposing movements in the expected real
return differential into a fraction attributable to changes in the ex ante nominal return
differential and the rest to movements in ex ante deviations from PPP.
Initially, let us assume that we can measure expectations of investors completely
accurately. Of course, in reality we cannot, so in a moment we will turn to how we
derive a measure of expectations, and what to do about the fact that the measure is not
one hundred per cent accurate. First, however, assume that we observe y EEr1
-
Erk; x =El'-Eik-Ed; and, z =Ed-Eiz+ EukSo, y is
1+1 1 tt+Itt+I (1+1 1 11+1 1 1+1 1 1+1
theexpected real interest differential, x is the expected nominal interest
differential, and z are expected deviations from PPP.
With these definitions yx1 + z. We would like to knowwhat makes y1 differ
from zero. That is, what makes the real interest differential at any time non-zero? Is
it because x is different from zero, or z? I I
Oneway one might think about measuring this is to calculate the average valuesof
7y, x and z, and then look at the ratio of the mean of x to the mean of y and the mean of
z to the mean of y. One problem with this approach is that over time y might fluctuate
between positive and negative. Its average might be low, but it may be substantially
different from zero in every period. So, the looking at the mean of y might conceal the
fact that the expected real interest differential is consistently non-zero.
We could avoid that problem by considering, for example, the average of the
absolute values of y, x and z, or the average of the squared values of y, x and z. But
this approach does not solve another problem --supposethat x tends to be negative in
periods when y is positive. Then, it would be misleading to say that large values of the
square of x are associated with large values of the square of y. When y is positive but
x is negative, z is pulling y above zero, and x is dragging it back down, so x is not
responsible for making y non-zero.
An alternative decomposition is to calculate the sample non-central second moments:
m(y,y) 'Ey2; m(x,y)4.Ex1y; etc. (where T is the number of observations.) Since
m(y,y) =m(x,y)+ m(z,y), it is natural to attribute to x the ratio m(x,y)Im(y,y)ofthe
average squared deviation of y from zero, and to attribute to z the remainder,
m(z,y)/m(y,y). For example, suppose that every period y =5, x=10and z =-5.Then,
under this decomposition, we have that 2.0 (200%) of the average deviation of y2 from 0
comes from x being different from zero, while -1.0 (-100%) comes from z. That makes
sense here, because y is always positive, but z is always negative. So, z tends to draw
y toward zero, but it is being pulled away from zero in the positive direction by the
large positive values of x. On the other hand, if for example every period y =5, x=4
and z =1,the fraction of the deviation we attribute to x is 4/5andto z, 1/5.
In practice we cannot measure y, x and z exactly. We will assume that we measure
expectations with error. Below we discuss precisely how we construct a measure of
8investors' expectations. So, we observe only y°,x°, andz°, which arerelatedto the
actual expectations by the following equations:
=+,
x°=x+ eX,and I t I
zo = z+ c. I I I
Thecrepresentmeasurement error terms.
We would like to measure m(x,y) but we do not observe either x or y (or z). We
m(y,y)
propose usingx°,y°)as an approximation to (x,y)• We can write:
m(y°,y°) m(y,y)
m(x°,y°)=m(x,y)+ I(Ycx) + m(x,&) + rn(cx,cY)
m(y°,y°) m(y,y) + 2m(y,c) + m(c,c)
Clearly, does not exactly equal
m(y°,y°) m(y,y)
If the difference between our measured expectations and the true expectations is
pure measurement error, then it is probably plausible to assume that the measurement
errors have means of zero, and are uncorrelated with y, x and z. Let mO represent the
population moment that is consistently estimated by mØ. Then, our assumption is that
the moments m(j,ck) for j,k =x,y,z,are zero. Imposing this, (and replacing sample
moments with population moments from the above equation) we have
m(x°,y°)=m(x,y)+ m(cX,CY)
m(y°,y°)m(y,y) +m(c,c)




Intuitively, this condition is just that the measurement error of x contributes as much
to the measurement error of y as x contributes to the deviation of y from zero.
Even if we do not accept the assumption under which m(x,y) equals so we
m(y°,y°)
do not believe that we can accurately measure the share of deviations of y from zero that
are attributable to x, we can compare these shares across countries under much weaker
assumptions. Much of our analysis of section 4 consists of precisely this type of
comparison. We ask, for example, whether countries with more flexible exchange rates
tend to have larger ex ante real return differentials because of fluctuations in the ex
ante nominal return differentials or in the ex ante deviations from PPP. We can make the













10Under these assumptions, is not equal to m(x°,y°) but in all countries the
m(y°,y°)
measurement is off by a scale factor of Thus, our measure correctly orders
countries by the size of even if we cannot measure that ratio consistently.
We now turn to the construction of our measures of the ex ante real return
differential, y E1 -Erk; the ex ante nominal return differential, x =Ei
I t 1+1 t 1+1 I I 1+1
- Eik-Ed; and, the ex ante deviation from PPP, z =Ed-En+
1+1 1 1+1 I 1 1+1 1 1+1 I1+1
Our measure of these variables are real time forecasts based on lagged values of
ji..k i
kd
k-ir+ i, andlags of the squares of i- rk,iik
k
and
1+11+1 1+1 1+11-I-It+I 1+1 1+11+1 1+1(+1
For example, suppose that we wish to derive the expectation at time s of
r rk .Then,we perform the regression of rjrk on ji..kclk,&k -n+71k
s+11+1 1I i—I I—II—I 1—1t—t t—1
and the squares of r1-r, and d i+ir, withdata on r1rk up
to time s. Then we use time s data to forecast r rk .Thento forecast r .+1z+I a+2 i+2
wereestimate the forecasting equation using data through time s+l. Hence, we get
"rolling" or "real time" forecasts of each of the variables.
We use only one lag of the various variables as forecasters, for several reasons.
First, as we discuss in the next section, we examine a relatively short time series on
equity returns. In part, this stems from the fact that only fairly recently have the
equity markets in many of the countries we examine become very large and open to foreign
investment. We also must use two years and one month of data to derive our first
forecast. So, the limited run of data constrains the number of lags that can be used in
the forecasting equation. In addition, we do not want to overfit the equation. In
preliminary work which is not reported, we added some right hand side variables such as
11the deviation of last month's value of the return differential from its average over the
prior six months. We found that such variables were usually not significant in the
regressions and did not improve the forecasting performance.
The deviation of our measure of the agents' expectations from their true
expectations will satisfy the properties stipulated above --thatis, have a mean of zero
and be uncorrelated with x, y, z and the other measurement errors --whentwo conditions
are met. First, we assume that investors have rational expectations. Hence, they use
all available information in an efficient way to construct their forecasts. We, as
economet.ricians, do not know precisely which variables agents use in deriving their
forecasts. The error we make in measuring the investors' expectations arises because we
leave out variables from our forecasting equation that investors use in arriving at their
expectations. So, our second condition is that the marginal forecasting ability of the
left-out variables be uncorrelated with the variables we include in the forecasting
equation. (That is, construct the forecast errors from our equation. If those we took
the fitted values of the projection of those errors onto the left-out variables, those
fitted values should be uncorrelated with our included right hand side variables.)
An alternative way of measuring expectations would be to follow the lead of Frankel
and Froot (1987), Froot and Frankel (1989) and Chinn and Frankel (1992) and use survey
data. Although arguably there would still be some measurement error in expectations
because the surveys might not cover comprehensively the relevant actors in the equity
markets, it is a good bet that such surveys provide more accurate measures of
expectations than the ones we construct. Unfortunately, we can find no surveys of
investors' expectations of equity returns, inflation and currency depreciation for most
of the countries in our study.
12III.Equity Markets and Foreign Exchange Markets in the Pacific Basin
We examine the behavior of equity returns from eleven countries that surround the
Pacific Ocean --Japan,Canada, Australia, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore,
Taiwan, Thailand and the United States. We use data on equity returns beginning in
September 1983 (with the exception of Taiwan, whose data begin in January 1986). Our
first forecast is for 25monthsafter the starting date of the data (October 1985 in most
instances). The data end in 1991 for most countries, and in 1990 for the rest.
Equity trading in Australia occurs on the Australian Stock Exchange in Sydney.
Share trading began in Sydney in 1828, with shares of a single company being traded.
Today there are essentially no restrictions on foreign investment in shares, and
foreigners are allowed membership on the exchange. The only minor restriction is imposed
by Australia's Foreign Take-over Act which limits foreign ownership of a firm to 15% of
the firm's value for a single investor.' Our stock index data for Australia are from the
All Ordinary Index. Our stock return data are taken from the Datastream International
tape for all countries except Chile, and are middle of the month, end of trading day.
Three-quarters of trades in shares in Canada occurs on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
The only restrictions on foreign investment in Canada are limits on foreign control of
certain companies such as banks. Foreigners are not allowed to be members of the Toronto
Stock Exchange, but membership is open on the Bourse de Montreal. The Toronto stock
exchange began trading in 1852, but informal trading began in Montreal in the 1820s. The
stock return data for Canada come from the Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index.
The Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago handles share trading in Chile. Trading began in
1 Most of our information on the nature of restrictions on international
investment in markets comes from either the 1990 edition of Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook of the International Finance Corporation, or the 1988 edition of the Directory fWorldStock Exchanges compiled by the Economist.
13Chile in 1893, and the markets have been relatively free since the liberalizations that
occurred in 1973. Chile underwent a severe financial crisis in the early 1980s, but the
stock market appears to have recovered by the mid-1980s. There are no restrictions on
the remittance of income earned by foreigners on the Chilean stock market, but the
initial capital invested must remain in Chile for at least three years. Foreigners are
allowed membership in the stock exchange. Our Chilean stock return series is taken from
International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange has been trading since 1878. There are essentially no
restrictions on foreign investment, and foreign brokers can obtain seats on the Exchange.
We use the Nikkei Dow Jones Average Index.
The Korean Stock Exchange was founded in Seoul in 1956. Until very recently there
have been severe limitations on investments by foreigners. Investment and repatriation
was subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance. However, foreigners could invest
through international investment trusts, the Korea fund and the Korea-Europe fund. In
January 1992, there was initiated a significant liberalization of the restrictions on
foreign investment, so that the major restrictions now require ownership of less than 10%
of the shares of any one company. Our Korean stock return data are constructed from the
Korea South Composite Index.
In Malaysia, trading occurs on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The market is
essentially open to foreigners --theymay obtain membership and trading is subject only
to the restriction that acquisitions exceeding M$5 million must be approved by the
Foreign Investment Committee. Investment is also possible for foreigners through a
mutual fund traded on international markets. We use the Financial Times Actuaries Index
for our data on Malaysian returns.
Trading on the Malay Peninsula dates back to the late nineteenth century, and, in
1930, the Singapore Stockbrokers Association became the first organized exchange. In
141960 the Maiayan Stock Exchange was chartered with trading in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
When Singapore seceded from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 it remained in the stock
exchange. The Stock Exchange of Singapore did not become an independent organization
until 1973. There are virtually no restrictions on foreign investment (there are some
requirements concerning the degree of foreign ownership of banks and newspapers) and
foreign brokers are allowed membership on the Singapore exchange. Our stock returns are
calculated from the Straits Times Index.
Mexico's share trading occurs at the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores in Mexico City.
Stock trading began there in 1894. Until the late 1980s there were a few significant
restrictions on foreign investments. Foreigners were not allowed seats on the exchange,
and foreign investors could not own shares in some industries: petroleum, petrochemical,
development of radioactive materials, some mining, electricity, railroads, telegraph,
radio and television, transport, national air transport and maritime companies, forest
exploitation and gas distribution. There has been considerable liberalization since
Carlos Salinas became President, however. In addition, a Mexico Fund is traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. For Mexico, we use data from the Financial Times Actuaries
Index.
In Taiwan, the Taipei Stock Exchange Corporation began trading in 1961. Foreign
nationals can trade under certain regulations, but otherwise investing for foreigners is
limited to closed-end mutual funds traded on the U.S. and European markets. The Taiwan
Weighted Index is the source of our stock returns for this country.
The Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET) trades securities in Bangkok. It began
trading in 1975 and is now fairly open to foreigners, except for restrictions which
prevent foreign interests from becoming majority shareholders. In addition, closed-end
mutual funds are traded on international markets. We use the SET Index for our stock
return data for Thailand.
15There are several stock exchanges in the United States, the largest of which is the
New York Stock Exchange. The NYSE began using that name in 1863, but share trading began
there in 1792. There are no rules for foreign investors that differ from those imposed
on domestic residents. We use returns from the Standard and Poor's 500 Index.
Table 1, from the 1990 edition of the Emerging £ll2c1cMarketsFactbook, indicates
the rapid growth in the markets we focus on. In the 1980s generally there was a sharp
increase in the number of different firms whose shares were traded —particularlyin the
smaller markets —andthe dollar value of shares traded expanded by a large factor in
all eleven countries.
In the period covered by our study on expected stock market returns (post-October
1985), many of our countries maintained essentially freely floating exchange rates. The
U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia can be characterized in this manner. The other seven
countries can be said to have been under managed floating regimes during the period of
our study. While some of these countries were officially pegging to a basket of
currencies, many of the rest were in essence unofficially following such a policy (see
the calculation of the basket weights in Frankel and Wei (1992)). All seven could be
characterized as having a "managed float". Hence, we will pay special attention to the
behavior of returns of the first four countries as compared to the other seven.
For most of the countries, the foreign exchange rate data are from the Datastseam
International tape. However, for Korea, Chile, Thailand and Mexico they are from
International Financial Statistics. For Taiwan, they are from the EPS database of
Academia Sinica in Taipei.
For all countries except Australia we use the consumer price index as our measure
of goods prices. For Australia we use the wholesale price index. For all countries
except Taiwan the price data are from International Financial Statistics. For Taiwan,
the source is the same as the exchange rate data.
16IV. Empirical Results
We look at the bivariate returnsforeach pair of countries. This means that there
are 55relativerates of return we can study. There is an issue of whether we should
examine each of the 55relativerates separately, since they are not independent. For
example, the forecast of the return on Australian equities relative to Japanese equities
should equal the forecast of the Australian/U.S. return less the U.S./Japanese return. A
full simultaneous general equilibrium econometric model that forecast each of the returns
relative to the U.S., for example, would not require any separate examination of the
remaining 45relativerates of return. However, such a model would require that all
information used to forecast any relative return be included in each relative return
equation. Given our limited data set, such a full-blown simultaneous estimation is
impractical. Hence, with estimation done equation by equation for each relative return,
and with a small set of regressors included in the forecasting equation, separate
information can be obtained from each of the 55relativereturn forecasts. That is, we
do not impose the constraint that our constructed forecasts of the Australian/Japanese
relative return equal the Australian/U.S. return less the U.S./Japanese return.
Table 2 contains some summary statistics for returns in the U.S relative to the
other countries. Table 2 is useful for pointing out some of the regularities that run
through much of the data. Looking at the first block of Table 2, the variable USAJAPY is
the cx post real return on equities in the U.S. relative to Japan. USAJAPX is the ex
post nominal return on equities in the U.S. relative to Japan. USAJAPZ is the ex post
real depreciation of the dollar. FORY is the forecast of USAJAPY. FORX is the forecast
of USAJAPX, and FORZ is the forecast of USAJAPZ. MYY is the sample second moment of the
forecasted relative real return on equities. MXY is the sample cross moment of the
17forecasted relative real return on equities with the forecasted nominal return on
equities. MZY =MYY-MXY,is the sample cross moment of the forecasted relative real
return on equities with the forecasted real depreciation of the currency.
The average forecast values of the variables of interest generally have the same
sign as the average ex post values, although not in every case. The standard deviations
of the forecasts, not surprisingly, are smaller than the standard errors of the ex post
realizations.
The absolute size of the average real return differential is larger for Chile,
Mexico, Thailand and Taiwan relative to each other and the other seven countries than the
real return differentials for those other seven countries relative to each other.
The absolute value of the nominal return differential (both ex post and ex ante) is
very large relative to the average change in the real exchange rate. Furthermore, again
both ex post and ex ante, the standard error of the change in the real exchange rate is
small compared to the standard error of the nominal return differential.
It is very difficult to detect any pattern in the size of the second moments across
countries. Based on the Dornbusch sticky-price model, one might have thought that those
countries with highly flexible nominal exchange rates would have large real return
differentials arising from large changes in the real exchange rate. However, the MZY for
the countries with floating exchange rates (U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia) is not
evidently any larger than for those with more controlled exchange rates. If anything,
the MZY are larger for the latter countries.
Table 3 contains our calculation of the share of deviations of the ex ante return
from zero that we can attribute to deviations from ex ante PPP. Of course, the share
attributable to deviations from zero of expected nominal return differentials is just one
minus the share reported in Table 3. Most of the real return differential can be
attributed to nominal return differentials over the vast majority of the relative rates
18we examine. In fact, usually the expected change in the real exchange rate has the
effect of drawing the ex ante real return differential closer to zero than the ex ante
nominal return differential.
There also does not appear, from Table 3, to be any relation between the role of
the expected real exchange rate change in determining the real return differential and
the type of exchange rate system operating in the various countries.
Table 4 performs some tests to see whether countries that tended to have high
nominal exchange rate variability also tended to have higher shares of real return
differentials caused by deviations from ex ante PPP. The dependent variable in these
regressions is the shares of real return differentials caused by PPP differentials. The
first equation regresses this share against the variance in the monthly log changes in
the exchange rate for all 55pairsof countries. Although the relation is positive, it
is not statistically significant. When we add in the mean percentage change as a way to
control for exchange rates that had large secular changes during our sample period, the
variance of changes still has a positive coefficient, but again is not significant. When
we perform the same regressions using only returns on U.S. investments relative to the
other countries, the relation is now negative --themore variable the exchange rate, the
lower the share of real return differentials that we can attribute to real exchange rate
changes. In the regression without the mean included, the negative relationship is
strongly significant.
In short, we find that expected real rates of return are different across the
Pacific Basin because expected nominal rates of return are different. There is not a
strong relation between the behavior of nominal exchange rates and the share of ex ante
real return differentials that we can attribute to expected changes in real exchange
rates.
19IV. Conclusions
We have noted that expected changes in the real exchange rate do not seem to be the
primary factor in determining the difference in real returns across Pacific Rim
countries. This result seems to conflict with earlier findings of Frankel (1986, 1992),
but several important caveats should be noted.
First, we do not control for risk. While we believe it is more appropriate to look
at equities rather than interest-bearing assets if we are to determine the factors
underlying patterns of investment in plant and equipment across countries, we must
recognize that one important reason that equity returns vary from country to country is
because of the difference in the riskiness of the investments. Hence, finding that the
expected nominal return differential accounts for most of the expected real return
differential on stocks does not necessarily imply that restrictions to capital mobility
are high. They may be low, and the market is simply properly rewarding risk-taking
activity.
Second, our measures of expectations assume investors have rational expectations.
While that is a common assumption in empirical finance, the work of Frankel and Froot
(1989) and Froot and Frankel (1990) calls it into question. Their analysis of survey
data suggest that there are persistent biases in market participants' forecasts.
Third, even if expectations are rational, it is very difficult to measure the
expectations without direct survey evidence. Hence, we inevitably are introducing large
errors into our measures of expectations. While we have argued that there should be no
inconsistency in large samples with our statistics, experience indicates that sample
sizes for models in which expectations are constructed need to be very large before we
can be confident of our measures. Here, we are restricted by the data to use series that
are no longer than seven years. In many cases, this may be insufficient to construct
20reliable statistics.
It appears thatthereare large expected return differentials across countries in
the Pacific Rim. The question that is left to future research is a finer understanding
of why these differentials persist.Is it because of risk or because of barriers to
international flows of capital?
21References
Cheng,H.S. 1986. FinancialPolicy Reform in Pacificin Countries. Lexington,
Mass: Lexington Books.
Chinn,M. and J. Frankel. 1992. Financial and Currency Links in Asia and the Pacific.
Manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz.
Dornbusch, R. 1976. Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics. Journal 21 Political
Economy 84: 1161-76.
Economist Publications, The. 1988. Directory f World £1Qc. Exchanges. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Engel, C. and K. Kletzer. 1989. Saving and Investment in an Open Economy with Non-Traded
Goods. International Economic Review 30: 735-752.
Feldstein, M. and C. Horioka. 1980. Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows.
Economic Journal 90: 314-29.
Frankel, J. 1986. International Capital Mobility and Crowding-out in the U.S. Economy:
Imperfect Integration of Financial Markets or Goods Markets? In ff Qi 1h
1L Economy? ed. R. Hafer, 33-67. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
_____1991.Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s. In National
Saving .n]s1 Economic Performance, eds. B.D. Bernheim and J. Shoven, 227-250.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
____1992.Measuring International Capital Mobility: A Review. American Economic
Review 82: 197-202.
_____and K. Froot. 1987. Using Survey Data to Test Standard Propositions Regarding Real
Exchange Rate Expectations. American Economic Review 77: 133-53.
_____and S.J. Wei. 1992. Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc: Exchange Rate Policies of the East
Asian Economies. Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
Froot,K. and J. Frankel. 1989. Forward Discount Bias: Is it an Exchange Risk Premium?
Quarterly Journal 21 Economics 104: 139-161.
Glick,R. 1987. Interest Rate Linkages in the Pacific Basin. Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Economic Review no. 3, 31-42.
_____and M. Hutchison. 1990. Financial Liberalization in the Pacific Basin:
Implications for Real Interest Rate Linkages. Journal 21 th Japanese nn1
International conomies 4: 36-48.
22International Finance Corporation. 1990. Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.
Razin, A. 1984. Capital Movements, Intersectoral Resource Shifts and the Trade Balance.
European Economic Review 26: 135-52.
23</ref_section>Table 1



































































SERIES 085 MEAN IJ ERROR
USAJAPY 100—0.0003376 0.055773 MYY =0.0007949
USAJAPZ 100 0.0047692 0.037539
USAJAPX 100-0.0051068 0.072914 MZY=0.0000636
FORY 75-0.0035397 0.028159
FORZ 75 0.0033539 0.019080 MXY =0.0007313
FORX 75-0.0068936 0.031655
USACANY 100 0.0064649 0.032131 MYY=0.0002045
USACANZ 100 0.0008201 0.011928
USACANX 100 0.0056448 0.032950 MZY=—0.0000082
FORY 75 0.0038543 0.013865
FORZ 75 —0.0002411 0. 005052 MXY=0.0002127
FORX 75 0.0040954 0.015298
USAAUSY 99—0.0017089 0.064185 MYY=0.0009744
USAAUSZ 99-0.0000962 0.031020
USAAUSX 99-0.0016126 0.076461 MZY=—0.0000585
FORY 74-0.0076150 0.030479
FORZ 74 0.0011029 0.009693 MXY=0.001033
FORX 74-0.0087179 0.033464
USACHLY 100-0.015285 0.075572 MYY=0.0006420
USACHLZ 100—0.002504 0.019489
USACHLX 100—0.012782 0.078293 MZY=-0.0000032
FORY 75—0.019970 0.015702
FORZ 75—0.003948 0.010643 MXY =0.0006452
FORX 75—0.016021 0.023228
USAKORY 100-0.0054688 0.073486 MYY =0.01187
USAKORZ 100 0.0015328 0.019311
USAKORX 100—0.0070016 0.076148 MZY=0.0003560
FORY 75—0.0045964 0. 10958
FORZ 75 0.0021502 0.011949 MXY =0.01151
FORX 75-0.0067466 0.10695
USAMALY 77 0.0017253 0.085450 MYY =0.005234
USAMALZ 77-0.0034767 0.013595
USAMALX 77 0.0052020 0.085686 MZY=0.0002617
FORY 52 0.025331 0.068427
FORZ 52—0.0010558 0.010260 MXY =0.004972



















CAN --Canada HAL --Malaysia




























































































































































































































VP.ALL variance of log changes in nominal exchange rates for all 55
bilateral rates.
MEANALL mean of log changes In nominal exchange rates for all 55 bIlateral
rates.
YRUS variance of log changes in nominal exchange rates for 10 bilateral
rates relative to U.S.
MEANUS mean of log changes in nominal exchange rates for 10 bilateral rates
relative to U.S.
(t—statistics in parentheses)